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Abstract: The liberalization of many former state governed natural monopolies in sectors such as 
electricity, railroad and telecommunications is done by partial deregulation. Typically, entry is 
invited into elements of the production chain, yet under strict price and quality controls. This note 
considers some potential welfare effects of an unconventional type of conditional deregulation, 
used in the electricity market in Flanders, Belgium, where the utility companies are held to 
deliver the households they supply a complimentary basic electricity package free of charge. It is 
shown that, while decreasing the number of new entrants into the liberalized market, such pro 
bono supply requirements can nevertheless increase net total production. A general condition for 
a welfare maximizing level of ‘forced freebies’ is derived.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The production of utilities such as gas, electricity and drinking water in many Western 
European countries used to be concentrated in fully vertically integrated single regional 
producers with natural monopoly characteristics, that were either privately owned and 
closely regulated – as in the United States – or ran as a public enterprise – the model of 
choice in Europe. Since the late 1980’s, however, there has been a growing awareness 
that not all the different functions in the production chain of the utilities need be collected 
in one integrated monopolist, and that instead substantial benefits can be had from 
inviting competition in those aspects of production where the economies of scale and 
scope are small, relative to market demand, so that several firms can be sustained in 
operation. By decoupling the generation and local retailing of electricity, for example, 
from its distribution, the natural monopoly characteristics in electricity supply are 
isolated where they truly exist: in the singular transportation network of power lines. As 
long as non-discriminatory access to this essential distribution facility is guaranteed by 
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government oversight, market competition amongst a number of retailers can be relied 
upon to drive down prices and increase productive efficiency.
1 
In the run-up to the 21st century, many formerly state-controlled utilities have 
accordingly been gradually liberalized. In the US electricity market, for example, this has 
led to substantial competition amongst the incumbent firms and new entrants.
2 Currently, 
the various member states of the European Union are deregulating and liberalizing their 
utility markets as well – albeit at somewhat dissimilar paces. Although none of these 
local markets has settled on an equilibrium with sufficiently many new entries yet, all 
these transition processes seem well directed.
3 
Obviously, the deregulation of these once dominant producers that, moreover, 
control the supply of such basic needs as energy and water, is a delicate process that 
cannot be expected to happen overnight. Maintaining a good quality of service at 
affordable prices is a serious concern. Therefore, in practice liberalization is a gradual 
process of partial deregulation, involving quality control and often complicated multi-part 
price ceilings. Although several scholars have pointed to drawbacks of partial 
deregulation, advocating a quick – even when possibly dirty – conversion to a fully 
operational market mechanism, others consider it a useful intermediate policy in 
transition to a fully free market, for example when there are information asymmetries.
4 
A very special kind of partial price control accompanying the liberalization of 
entry into the household supply of electricity is seen in Flanders, the Dutch speaking part 
of Belgium. In its January 2002 decree on the liberalization of the Belgian electricity 
market, the Flemish government determined that every seller of electricity active on the 
open market – be it a new entrant or the established incumbent Electrabel – has the 
public service obligation to supply every household it serves yearly with 100 KWh of 
electricity per household, plus 100 KWh per person living at the connected address free 
of charge.
5 
Only on the surplus consumption of electricity above this threshold is the 
electricity supplier allowed to bill a positive price. For an average Belgian family of four, 
this 500 KWh of electricity free of charge amounts to between 15 and 20 percent of 
yearly use. The obligation to supply all households in Flanders this pro bono amount was 
initially intended to be transitory and in force only until July 2003. Its enforcement period 
was extended, however. Moreover, the Belgian government followed the Flanders 
initiative and required a permanent free of charge threshold supply of 556 KWh per 
household for designated groups of citizens, typically the elderly and the needy, 
independent of the constitution of the household.
6 Finally, households that experience 
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difficulties in paying their electricity bills cannot be disconnected and are guaranteed a 
continuous minimum supply of six ampere. 
These Belgian pro bono supply requirements were originally inspired by social 
concerns of Flander’s socialist minister of energy, Steve Stevaert. The requirement was to 
correct for Stevaert’s concern that it would first and foremost be large buyers and the 
producers of electricity that would benefit from liberalized access to the market, rather 
than ordinary consumers. The complimentary electricity was to redistribute part of these 
alleged asymmetric gains. However desirable these normative considerations – which is a 
political issue – may be, obliging the utility companies to deliver complimentary basic 
utility packages makes entry into the newly opened electricity market less attractive. This 
may, in fact, well lead to a net consumer detriment. After all, the supply of the pro bono 
electricity package is below costs, thus constituting a loss for each producer that is to be 
recouped on the sale of electricity over and above the complimentary bundle. This is 
likely to reduce the number of firms that can be sustained in the market in equilibrium, 
and hence the level of competition for the provision of electricity. As a result, consumer 
prices may well be higher, possibly leading to a net increase in total electricity costs for 
the average Belgian household over and above the total electricity bill without the 
obligatory free base supply. 
When limited to this effect, the Flemish partial liberalization would probably not 
live up to its social expectations. However, the pro bono supply requirement can have a 
beneficiary effect on welfare as well. The requirement, namely, introduces an obligatory 
form of price-discrimination. By inducing the utility companies to supply a fixed amount 
free of charge, and then determine the rest of their output on the residual demand curve, 
total individual production typically increases in the size of the pro bono package. The 
reason for this is that the dilemma of single price-setting firms that marginal revenue 
decreases in sales for the entire output is partly solved by legal requirement. For a given 
number of sellers in the market, this has the effect of increasing total output, thus 
enhancing welfare. 
Combined, these two opposing effects raises the question under what conditions 
the total output reduction effect of the lower number of electricity suppliers in the market 
in equilibrium is dominated by the increase in supply that each one of them is induced to 
by the pro bono supply requirement, so that a net increase of total output and hence 
welfare results. This qualitative issue is considered in this paper, which is organized as 
follows. The next section illustrates the unambiguous increased output effect from the 
pro bono supply requirement in a single firm setting. Section 3 then first extends the 
analysis to a market in which a fixed number of firms is in Cournot competition. It is 
subsequently established that the total number of firms in the Cournot equilibrium with 
entry is reduced in the level of pro bono supply. Section 4 weighs the two effects and 
establishes and optimal level of pro bono supply. Section 5 concludes. 
Before proceeding to the analysis, a remark is in order here. Electricity markets 
and their (partial) liberalization worldwide have been modeled and understood in their 
intricate detail elsewhere.
7 It is not our objective to capture such detail here. This note is 
instead intended to point out a qualitative effect of pro bono supply requirements only. 
For that, a simple Cournot model suffices. Also, it allows us to abstract from additional 
regulatory constraints, such as further price controls on the extra-marginal supply. 
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Analyzing the welfare effects of forced freebies in a more complete setup is an interesting 
topic for further research and a requirement before introducing pro bono supply 
requirements in any actual market. 
 
2 Single  Firm  Pro Bono Benefits 
 
Consider the following stylized model of household electricity supply. A single supplier 
sells electricity to households in Belgium measured in KWh per year. Demand is given 
by an inverse demand function  () Q P , where Q is the total yearly sales of electricity. It is 
assumed that demand decreases in price, that is  () 0 ' < Q P , as long as the price is positive. 
In the following, we abstract from industrial demand and consider only the generation 
and retail of electricity for domestic use. A natural monopolist maintains and operates the 
distribution system, and offers the service of transportation electricity at a fixed fee per 
unit. As a result, the electricity supplier produces with fixed costs  0 ≥ F  and variable 
costs  () Q C . 
Consider first the behavior of the firm in the absence of any regulation in this 
market. It seeks to maximize profits as follows. 
  () () , max Q C F Q Q P
Q − −   
so that its choice of output is governed by the first-order condition 
  () () () Q C Q QP Q Q P ' ' = + .        (1) 
Assume that 
0 Q  is the unique quantity that maximizes profits. 
Next consider the effect of introducing the obligation to produce a free amount of 
the product  F Q . This changes the profit maximization problem of the monopolist into 
  () ( ) () , max Q C F Q Q Q P F Q − − −   
where  Q still is total output, now including the amount of electricity supplied for free. 
Note that although the Belgian pro bono supply requirement that inspired this analysis 
specifies an amount free of charge per household – so that  F Q  varies in the total number 
of households – in the following we abstract from this issue and assume instead that entry 
into the market requires a fixed pro bono supply. Since electricity is viewed by 
government as a basic necessity, it seems reasonable to assume that the number of 
connections is fixed, so that this setup suffices. 
Facing the requirement to deliver a basic utility package free of charge, the 
monopolist’s first-order condition for an optimum is 
  () () ( ) () . ' ' Q C Q Q Q P Q P F = − +        (2) 
Comparing equations (1) and (2), the key thing to notice is that for every level of 
production marginal revenue increases by the introduction of the pro bono supply 
requirement. This is immediate from the assumption that  () 0 ' < Q P  and the observation 
that  Q Q Q F < −  for every positive level of  F Q . 
The intuition for the output stimulation effect of the pro bono supply requirement 
is straightforward as well. It follows from the well-know ‘monopolist’s dilemma’ that for 
a supplier with some price-setting power that can only set a uniform price for its product  5
– that is, that does not have the option of price-discrimination – marginal revenue is a 
decreasing function of sales. This is so, because supplying one unit of extra output 
requires lowering the price on all other units as well. The introduction of the obligation to 
supply some output free of charge partly solves this dilemma for the monopolist. The 
reason for this is that the price only has to be lowered on the last  F Q Q −  units, leading to 
an increase of the marginal revenue for all units over  F Q Q −  - obviously, all lower 
output has marginal revenue equal to zero. Moreover, at  F Q Q =  the marginal revenue 
for the extra unit of output is exactly equal to the price. 
Clearly, when marginal revenue rises and marginal costs are given, profits 
increase with output. Figure 1 illustrates the effect for the simplest possible case with 
linear demand and constant marginal costs, leading to average costs  () Q AC . The total 
amount of freebies shifts the demand curve to the left – illustrated as a shift of the price 
axis to the right. On the residual demand, the monopolist can best offer 
* Q , of which it 
then sells  F Q Q −
*  at price 
* P . Of the profits thus made on the output actually sold, the 
area  abcd , the loss made on the pro bono supply, the area  ( )
* Q OAC dQF , is to be 
subtracted to determine total profits. 
 
Figure 1. Production increases and profits decrease with ‘forced freebies’  F Q . 
 
Without the pro bono supply, the producer would put 
0 Q  on the market and sell it at 
0 P , 
thus making a total profit  ( )
0 0 Q efAC P  in the figure. Evidently, the profit without the 
obligation to deliver part of the complimentary goods is considerably higher than with 
that requirement. The increase in output pointed at here is immediate from the fact that 
the marginal revenue curves with and without the pro bono supply requirement are 
parallel and shifted by  F Q . This output increasing effect from the pro bono supply 
requirement also follows unambiguously from a simple comparative statics exercise on 
equation (2). 
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3  Competition and Entry with Pro Bono Supply 
 
The above monopoly analysis shows the potential of pro bono supply requirements to 
raise output. The potential detrimental effect of lowering the number of competitors in 
equilibrium requires a model with several firms and entry, considered in this section. 
Under the qualifications given in the introduction, let there be n identical electricity 
retailers in Cournot competition. Let  F q  denote the size of the complimentary energy 
package in KWh per year that has to be supplied by each firm. In the Flanders example 
again,  F q  would be equal to the total number of households that demand electricity, 
times the size of the pro bono package per household, divided by the number of firms. 
For simplicity, however, in the following we consider a single variable  F q  per firm in the 
market, the size of which is controlled by the government. Since we consider symmetric 
Cournot-Nash equilibria only, this assumption is innocuous. Each supplier faces fixed 
costs  F , and variable costs given by  () i q C , where  i q  is individual energy production. 








Each individual firm determines its supply of electricity in best reply to the supply 
of the others, by solving 
  () ( ) () . max i F i
q q C F q q Q P
i
− − −   
Assume that there exists a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies to this 
market behavior. For a given number of firms n that each produce q, that symmetric 
equilibrium then is implicitly defined as a solution to the individual first-order condition, 
i.e., 
  () () ( ) ( ) . 0 ' ' = − − + q C q q nq P nq P F        (3) 
Denote that solution by  () F q n q ; , so that the corresponding aggregate output in the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is  ()() F F q n nq q n Q ; ; = . We then have the following result. 
 
Proposition 1. For a given number of firms n, assume that at the symmetric Cournot-
Nash equilibrium the inverse demand function satisfies 










Proof. A simple comparative statics exercise performed on (3) yields 
  ()
( )() () ( ) ()
,
' ' ' ' ' 1
'




F F − − + +
=   




 since  7
( )() () ( ) ()
( ) () () ( ) ( ) () () ( ) () [] , ' ' ' ' ' 2 ' ' ' 1
' ' ' ' ' 1
q C q q Q P Q P q q Q P Q P n
q C q q Q nP Q P n
F F
F
− − + + − + − =
− − + +
 
of which the part in squared brackets is non-positive since it corresponds to the individual 








Under relatively mild restrictions on the shape of cost and demand functions, which do 
not go far beyond the conditions necessary for a maximum, market supply for a given 
number of firms in Cournot competition, therefore, reacts to the pro bono supply 
requirement similarly to the profit maximizing output of the single monopolist. 
Next consider the detrimental effect of the pro bono supply requirement on entry 
into the market. The equilibrium number of firms is determined endogenously, such that 
the profits per firm are equal to zero in equilibrium.
8 That is, the equilibrium number of 
firms under free entry and exit,  () F q n n =
* , is implicitly defined by the following zero 
profit condition.
9 
  ( ) () () ( ) () ( ) () . 0 ; ; ; ;
* = − − − = F F F F F q n q C F q q n q q n nq P q n π    (5)   
The effect on the number of entrants of variations in the amount of electricity that is 
decreed to be delivered free of charge can then be identified as in the following result. 
 
Proposition 2.  Assume that at the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the inverse 





Proof. Taking the total differential of (5) and rewriting it, using the symmetric Nash-
equilibrium condition (3) returns 
 
() ( ) ( ) ()




































. That the latter is true is seen by 
totally differentiating equilibrium condition (3) once more to get 
  () () ( )
( )() () ( ) ()
.
' ' ' ' ' 1
' ' '
q C q q Q nP Q P n






− − + +
− +
− =   
Using the individual second-order conditions for an optimum, it follows 
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4  Optimal Forced Freebies 
 
Having thus established a potential efficiency decreasing, as well as a welfare increasing 
effect of the pro bono supply requirement, we are in position to consider the full question 
what happens to total output Q in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium under free entry when 
F q  increases. That is, we can weigh the two opposite effects that on the one hand the 
number of firms in equilibrium typically decreases, while on the other the output per 
individual firm increases. Total output in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium as a function of 
F q  is given as 
  () () () ( ). ;
* *
F F F F q q n q q n q Q =   





















 + =  


















*  that is unambiguously positive. 
One way to look at the regulatory issue at hand is as the government facing the 
following sequential game. In the first stage it decides on the amount of electricity each 
firm is obliged to provide free of charge,  F q . In the second stage a Cournot oligopoly 
game with free entry is played, given  F q , in which a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
establishes in n and q, determining total output Q as their product. The level of  F q  thus 
is the authority’s instrument in governing total production in the market. Hence, it should 
pick  F q  in the first stage of the game so as to maximize welfare. 
Substituting  F q
n
Q
−  from the Cournot-Nash equilibrium condition (3), the 





























Q C Q P Q P
n Q π      (6) 
Let the relationship between Q and n that is implicitly defined by this zero-profit 
condition be  () n g Q = , and let 
* n  be the value of n for which the maximum level of Q 
is attained.  ( )
* * n g Q = . The government then can implement the optimal production 
level by setting the appropriate level of pro bono supply in the first stage of the game as – 


























+ =        (7) 
Note that certain constraints apply. Although in principle, the number of firms could 
approach infinity by letting  F q  take on negative values, it seems reasonable to require 
that  F q , as given by (7), be nonnegative. That is, the pro bono supply should not take the 
form of a subsidy for the firms. This puts an upper-bound on  n n, . Let the quantity 
produced when  0 = F q  and therefore,  n n =  be denoted by  () 0 Q . Furthermore, let the 
individual quantity  ()
n
Q 0
 be  () 0 q . Then, the following result summarizes the main 




F q  be the optimal amount of forced freebies. Then: 
(i)  0
* = F q  if the individual cost functions satisfy  () 0 ' > q C  and  () 0 ' ' ≥ q C;  
(ii) 0
* > F q   if 
  () () ( ) () ( ) ()( ) (); 0 0 ' 0 ' 0 ' ' 0 < − q C Q P q C Q P   
(iii) if an interior solution exists, it satisfies 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . 0 ' ' ' '
* * * * = − F F F F q q C q Q P q q C q Q P   
 
Proof. Taking the total differential of (7) and rewriting gives, 
 
() ( ) () ()
,
' ' ' '
1
1 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2


















 − + − − −
−
− =  (8) 
where  P  and its derivatives are evaluated in Q and C , and the derivatives of the latter 
are evaluated in 
n
Q
. From the second-order condition that derives from the individual 
firm’s optimization problem it follows that the first expression in the denominator is 
positive. Therefore, it follows from (8) that a crucial role for the optimal number of firms 
in the market is played by the sign of 
















C Q P n Q κ   
In particular, if  () 0 , > n Q κ , an increase in the number of firms will increase aggregate 
output. Clearly, this requirement holds globally for all convex cost functions (i.e., cost 
functions with  () 0 ' ' > q C ), but also for technologies with constant and positive marginal 
costs. Moreover, if  () 0 , < n Q κ  for pure free entry, that is, at  0 = F q , then this cannot be 
optimal. Finally, an interior solution has to correspond to  () 0 , = n Q κ .■ 
 
Incidentally, the condition for an interior solution stated in the Theorem allows for an 






qP = ε  





=  for each 
firm, since all other firms keep their output constant. Furthermore, let 









be the individual firm’s elasticity of marginal cost, which measures the responsiveness of 
marginal cost to changes in the output. Then result (iii) in the Theorem can be restated as 
follows. 
 
Corollary. An interior optimal level of forced freebies, 
*







It is immediate that, since the price elasticity of demand is negative, pro bono supply 
requirements can only be optimal under increasing returns to scale in production. It is 
well known that in the single-product context increasing returns to scale are a sufficient 




5 Concluding  Remarks 
 
In the process of liberalizing elements of former public utilities, governments have 
institutionalized various restrictions intended to keep the potential unwanted 
consequences of imperfect competition at bay, while reaping the benefits of enhanced 
competition. We have pointed out two qualitative effects of partially deregulating 
previously restricted market access with price controls that take the form of pro bono 
supply requirements. These tend to reduce the number of utility companies that can be 
sustained in equilibrium, yet increase the level of supply of each one of them. Weighing 
these two opposite effects, we have characterized an optimal level of forced freebies. 
Interestingly enough, there are conditions under which introducing pro bono supply 
requirements enhances welfare. We took the special Belgian decree on free basic 
electricity packages for domestic use as a case in point. Yet, there seems good political 
rational to indeed offer basic subsistence utility packages for the needy on a wider scale. 
After all, energy, warmth and water are essential needs for a humane existence. Such 
measures would need to be taken well-informed and wisely, however, since the 
quantification of any level of optimal forced freebies in any actual market would be a 
difficult task. It requires a large amount of information on the part of the government, as 
well as an understanding of additional regulatory constraints and competitive issues here 
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ignored.
11 Yet, when well-applied, forced freebies have the potential to make politically 
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